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On Body and Soul
GUILHERME WERLANG
Universidade Federal Fluminense (Brazil)
gwerlang@gmail.com
Since thought is inseparable from action and motivation, we are not so much 
dealing with different “logics” or rationalities as with total modes of being, of 
inventing self and society.
   —Roy Wagner (1981 [1975]:117)
... the Piaroa do not tend to oppose, in the way we do, thinking and acting. 
We cannot use our gloss of “mind” and “body” to capture their way of 
understanding this distinction.  They, in fact, have no term for “body.”   
   —Joanna Overing (1996:14)
INTRODUCTION
 This paper discusses the plausibility of notions of “body” and “soul” 
within the dual universe of the Marubo from Southwestern Amazonia.1  At 
two levels the discussion implies “an acquaintance with the epistemologies 
and ontologies of other cultures” (Overing 1985:7).  The first concerns a 
poststructuralist perspective on epistemological issues in Amazonia.  The 
second, which has taken place in the twenty years since the publication 
of Reason and Morality, concerns a shift in understanding of indigenous 
ontology, that is, as the “presentation”—rather than the “investigation” or 
“account” of the origins of the cosmos and all forms of being therein—
toward the knowledge of the performance of a cognitive ethos.
 These two views correspond to those set out by Dan Rosengren (intra). 
My own conclusions point to a step beyond Overing’s past preoccupations, 
one she herself seems intent to take: from “attention to ordinary language 
use, the pragmatics of ordinary speech acts” to the form, poetic or otherwise, 
of what “others say about their social worlds” (Overing 1985:7–19).2   
 The following ethnographic excerpts have been largely left out from 
my previous writings on myth among the Marubo, an indigenous people 
from the Upper Javari Valley (Brazilian Amazonia).  My previous writings 
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have analysed one or a few fragments or aspects of their mythology (see 
Melatti 1985, 1986, 1989; and Werlang 2002, 2003).  An exhaustive 
account is still yet to be made.3  My focus has been primarily on music. 
The Marubo call their saiti, which I translate as “myth-chants.” 
 Fernando Santos-Granero suggests (intra) that Aristotelian 
psychophysiology can offer precepts affecting our bodies before our souls 
conceptualize them.4  With this in mind, I analyze saiti as myth in song, 
as song in myth.  Marubo “psychophysiology” can, as for the Yanesha, 
analytically be placed in dialogue with Aristotle and Plato.  In saiti, the 
Marubo enact an encounter among themselves and between their own 
body-constituent souls, which is quite alien to cognitive hierarchies.  It is 
an intercommunal festival, and as such saiti arises as a foremost event in 
Marubo social lives.  In this regard and in its musicality, saiti transcends 
the Platocratic discourses about the divine, the heroic, and dystopic.  It is 
rather an “encounter between humans and gods, in a world that, at each of 
these encounters, is the scenario wherein each encounter unfolds” (Sousa 
1973:118).  It is an encounter that enfolds bodies and souls, humanity and 
animality.
 Marubo ontology is, in saiti, performative.  It has as much to do with 
“gods” as with “bodies” and “souls.”  As such, “being” among the Marubo 
has less to do with epistemology and more to do with religion and ritual.5 
This is as far from a positivist statement as it is from a platitude (cf. Sousa 
1975).
SAITI MYTH-MUSIC
 What follows is a brief transcribed summary of five saiti, with their 
corresponding musical cell:
Mokanawa Wenia: “the emergence of the bitter-wild peoples”:
Shane Memi Yõsha: “old blue-green Memi woman”:6
2
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Yawa Tivo: “prototypical peccary”:
Teté Teka: “the shooting of the hawk”
Vei Vai Yoya: “the guide to the dangerous-transformational path”:
 
All these saiti present some sort of dualism, due to their intrinsic duality 
qua myth-chants (myth texts against chant intonations), and due to their 
musicality (the very poetic quality that shall be left apart—apart from the 
musical cells that, for each saiti, the scores above summarize).  Note that 
each reiterative cell (saiti is minimalist music to the utmost) presents two 
contrasting sections—a feature that is self-evident, and emphasized by 
the distribution of verbal verses (see Werlang 2001).
 In their content, all of these saiti deal in some way with humans 
and animals.  Inferentially, it is in such narrative deployment that we 
may infer an indigenous dualism and the cogency (or lack thereof ) of 
the body/soul duality in Marubo ontology.  The reader shall decide for 
themselves the extent to which this interpretative approach succeeds in 
saying something additionally informative about these peoples—or better 
still, about saiti myth-music.
MYTHICAL-MUSICAL DUALISM
 The foregoing dual dialectics of form in saiti refer neither to the musical 
dimension of the myth-chants alone, nor only to the tonal character of the 
words in the chants above.  The conspicuous formal character of the saiti 
vocal genre is also apparent when words take their verbal level in pitchless 
phonetics: in strophes, rhymes, and poetical devices.  The recurrence of 
certain verbal formulas characterizes every saiti.  More often than not, a 
wider verbal structure of the saiti myth-chants appears on paper, in the 
visual bidimensionality of their verbal translation.  Still, in some myth-
chants, shown at a more encompassing level than that of the musical cell, 
3
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the division (between the visual and the verbal) reveals something other 
than pure semantic clusters or narrative stages.  The main significance of 
these musical cells resides  in those thematic-formal groupings (strophes, 
rhymes, poetical devices) of several verbal verses that move beyond the 
cellular dimension of their intonation while still emulating it.  More often 
than not, this boils down to a formal dualism.
 Take the saiti of Shane Memi Yõsha, where the linear narrative is twofold 
in its widest dimension, that is, one narrates the story, then the “story,” 
“Old” Shane Memi, “Blue-Green” Memi “narrates itself,” repeating the first 
verbal section almost word for word.  This alone confers an overall unity to 
the one hundred and eight verses and the corresponding isomorphic cells 
of this saiti.  Then its concluding verse, the ending of its verbal discourse, 
reaffirms the secondary or, in fact, third-person viewpoint taken in the 
course of the narrative by means of a recurrent formula in myth-chants: 
a ikiao i, “thus spake” Shane Memi Yõsha.7  The centrality of this main 
character provides the agential voice of the narrative, more than that of 
a protagonist.  The saiti performers silence their own agency through the 
very sound of their voices.
 Singers in festivals always respond to a leading voice.  The “chant-
leader,” (yoya) intones a verbal verse that a chorus repeats ipsis litteris 
successively, always to the same musical cell.  In each saiti, each verse 
corresponds to one of the respective cells above: for n verbal verses; and for 
each saiti, one and the same musical cell.  The chant-leader constructs the 
narrative while the responding singers walk in pairs, in circles, “journeying” 
as they say.
 The verbal content of this saiti might shed light on the musical journey 
of Shane Memi Yõsha.  It may distract our attention from the indigenous 
meanings as well, and could also lead us into an essentialist blunder.  But 
its comparisons and generalizations might be worth the risk, if such 
distraction directs us back to the saiti sonic dialectics of verbal phoneme 
and musical pitch, and their own hierarchies of form.  
 As with other mythical characters in Amazonia (e.g., Stolze Lima 
1999:43), Shane Memi becomes a victim of abduction.  She is taken away 
as a result of her unfortunate intent to procure a tapir liver right through 
the anus of the sleeping animal.  The tapir wakes up and dashes away 
wildly through a toponymic and ethnonymic route, taking Shane Memi for 
a journey up and down the earth and sky.  When her children find Shane 
Memi, they can hardly recognize her.  She was nearly a tapir herself, lying 
on a trap set by her own sons.
 Taken from variations in myth, a structural syllogism would lead us 
to think that the Marubo myth/chants use similar relations between prey 
animals as other Amazonian mythic themes do in general.  Indeed, as in the 
4
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stories told by Rosengren (intra), Shane Memi suffers because of improper 
predatory intercourse with the tapir, a deviant behaviour resulting in an 
excessive identification with the animal.  As in other Amazonian myths, 
the protagonist shares food with the animal, or alternatively produces 
offspring with it.  Here, such substantial identification with the animal 
fades away when a third, human-consanguineous party, preys on it with 
traps or arrows.  The ludicrous fate of the transgressor (having been taken 
away by an anus) is structurally similar to a shamanic trip.  It is a form 
of access to a celestial realm or the very transmutation of the body.  The 
successful hunt puts an end to the pseudopredatory intercourse, which 
identifies prey and predator before (or beyond) the act of predation.
 Beyond analogical syllogisms, however, we must devote our attention 
to literal as well as local paradoxes.  These appear to be the basis for the 
more comparative aspect of the saiti myth-chants, being indeed more 
than mere common traits found throughout the region.  From alien to 
grand universalistic formulations, this analytical stance shall allow for 
ethnographic synthesis, because the same identification between human 
and animal that myth posits and negates remains latent in its musical 
ontology.
PERSONS AND PEOPLES, SPIRITS AND DOUBLES
 The Marubo speak Panoan.  In their language, for every yora—a 
nonethnic-specific self-designation—there exists an array of self-
constitutive “souls.”  For every individual “body” there are several souls 
which, in their integration, define the concept of humanity that yora 
implies.  For each human yora, there is a left-side soul mechmirí vaká that 
is a potential yochĩ (an “animal double” and disease agent), and there is a 
right-side soul mekiri vaká that is a potential yové (“spirit”).
 The yochĩ is the most suitable candidate for a hypostasis of evil in 
missionary speech.8   Missionaries translate it as bicho, a local idiom for 
“animal,” or “beast.”  It emanates from sexual intercourse between humans 
and animals while hunting.  Immoral behavior between human prey and 
predator, as in the story above, liberates noxious yochĩ.  Also, this “double” 
identifies with excreta and corpses, and with all that degenerates, all things 
past.  It is the material counterpart of memories that infuse the belongings 
and dwellings of those who have passed away.9  It favors dwelling in places 
of solitude and the forest.
 The yové spirit is an acquirable capacity, a skill that inheres to the 
human voice and sense of sight, and in consequence, to human thoughts. 
A shaman once heard my singing and saw my yové.  He said he saw designs 
5
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on my throat, kene mõnti.  “Hearing ‘beauty’ (roaka) is seeing spirit,” he 
said. 
 In vision, the yové manifests as latency rather than actuality.  When 
it manifests as actuality, it does so as musical performance.  Besides the 
synesthetic association of design and sound, so familiar to panologists (e.g., 
Gebhart-Sayer 1985), the yové manifests itself as mannikins who inhabit the 
forest canopy.  Similar to gnomes or fairies, they constitute a “supernatural” 
reality which only shamans can see.  Conversely, the perception of 
shamans coheres with the way one perceives these.  Shamanic bodies and 
bodily transformations—fragrant, melodious, and ornamental—though 
of this world, point toward an otherworldly reality of mortal becoming 
and of immortal renovation in the supernal abode of the dead (shoko nai 
shavaya).  The yové actuality is performative, anthropomorphic, and rather 
synesthetic.  Its latency in humans, in the form of mekiri vaká (right-hand 
soul) has a temporal tenure.
 The gloss “spirit,” or spirituality, might evoke the body versus soul 
dichotomy to many of us, thus precluding any corporeality.  But the yové 
“other” reality, as mannikin, precludes such a dichotomy, while implying 
another dichotomy of nature verses “supernature.”  A counterdistinction 
against yochĩ doubles would lead, in turn, to that of humanity versus 
animality.  Readers should take my glosses with a grain of salt.  Here 
“spirit” refers to spirare, to breathing rather than to “spirituality,” while 
duplicity refers to ambiguity rather than dichotomy.
 Let me qualify this.  While the yochĩ is the present double of animals, 
and the past and future animal double of humans (living and dead)—of 
their left-hand mechmirí vaká soul—the epitome of the yové spirit is the 
mawa bird, an occasional healing helper, the counterpart of the human 
mekirí vaká (the spirit-becoming right-hand soul).  Although we may 
gloss yochĩ as “animal double” while we gloss yové as “spirit,” these animalic 
diacritics for corporeal, “left” and “right” vaká have much in common. 
Both yochĩ and yové are entities encountered in the shaman’s discourse.  In 
this discourse, both are indiscriminately akin to animals first and foremost 
(and to dead humans and living shamans too), but not to literal animality 
only.  Between the animality and spirituality of these entities, the binomial 
distinction has more to do with psychophysiology and eschatology, that is, 
what the person is in relation to and to what they shall be.  After death, 
while the left-hand mechmirí vaká should linger on earth, the right-side 
mekiri vaká ascends to the skies.  
 In the Marubo sublunar world, however, there is no conformation 
of yochĩ and yové as antinomies.  What predictably would have been 
paradoxical of one or the other, in a (Platocratic) ontological hierarchy, 
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cannot conform to generational and degenerational forms of existence 
set against a realm of eternity.  In this epistemology, the glosses “animal” 
and “spirit” cannot be taken at face-value.   These terms offer semantic 
temporal inflections—given in the words and notes of myth-chants—the 
successive verbal lines and reiterative musical circles of its poetics.
 As latent inflections, the saiti myth-chants represent a duality of 
transforming entities.  The vaká souls of the yora body are multiple and 
transformative, although at their substratum is individually integrated. 
Marubo souls and bodies have the latent possibility among themselves of 
ambiguous relationships, that is, dialectical relationships not amenable to 
our familiar syllogisms.  The souls transcend bodies, becoming  literally 
immanent to human beings.  This is so to the extent that saiti circular 
lines (the musical-mythical past and future) occur at all levels of human “ 
breathing consciousness” (chinã), i.e., not as concept, but as performance: 
shamanic chant-leader and generic chorus; male elder and apprentice; and 
gender-generic youth.
 The issue of soul transformability, once taken as irreducible to 
invariant bodies, could indeed lead to wide generalizations for the 
whole of Amazonia.  Marubo bodies do, in fact, change over time as a 
response to (or as a cause of, since there is little room for teleology here) 
the spatiotemporal dynamics of cosmic souls, both within and outside 
of humans.  But the widest, collective definition of humanity for these 
peoples, their ethnonymic self-designation as -nawa, their notion of 
“being of a kind” stands in distinction to bodies as such, that is, to yora.  As 
among other Amerindians, such as the Piaroa (Overing 1996), here “being 
of a kind” means the most intimate, convivial kinship.  Still these -nawa 
peoples, while cultivating conviviality, epitomize an exogenous perspective 
that is fundamental to indigenous ethnicity.  Among the Marubo, one 
cannot confuse alterity with a differential corporeality.  For the Marubo, 
unlike the Matsigenka (Rosengren intra), homogeneous multiplicity gains 
a positive identifying value, and although the Marubo ultimately have an 
exogenous perspective, nawa as a single word (and not as a suffix) means 
“foreigner.”  This is what panologists have called “constituent alterity” 
(Erikson 1986, 1996).
 Among the Marubo, all -nawa peoples gain their -nawa names after 
various inanimate entities, as well as plants and animals.  Yet it is within 
yora bodies proper that the yové versus yochĩ latency of all souls allows 
for the proper identification between humans and animals.  This is of 
particular importance and a prerequisite for hunting.  Here, as elsewhere in 
South America, in attracting it to the predatory situation, one has to lure 
game by addressing it in either affinal or consanguineal terms.  A shamanic 
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agreement or pact can be set beforehand.  Whichever is done, this pact 
always disguises the dissimilarity of prey and predator (as an actuality, 
at least) in order to reassert it in the actual act of predation.  Shamanic 
intervention may actualize a subliminal ontological identity within 
cosmological ecosystems, thus establishing a given soul commonality that 
contradicts body variability.  The claim seems to be valid enough among 
the Marubo, as generally in Amazonia, that shamanic capabilities (notably 
cynegetic ones) presuppose the variable bodily forms that one soul can 
assume, rather than extraneous souls within a single material body.  This 
is of course true only when assuming that a face-value opposition between 
bodies and souls exists.10   
 This assumption of a body and soul distinction precludes such a 
fascinating and promising comparison among these shamanic practices. 
One is hard pressed, at a performative level, to render intelligible such 
conceptual/perceptual distinctions between yora bodies and soul-like 
entities such as yochĩ and yové, and mechmirí and mekirí vaká.  From their 
linguistic usage these terms have more relevance than Procrustean bodies 
versus souls (see Storrie intra).
  The relations that human souls establish and enact in shamanic 
séances and through ritual language would be more akin to the bodily, 
synesthetic experience reached through sense manipulation, drugs, music, 
and movement—all elements that constitute saiti.  Through the synesthetic 
experience, the shaman achieves alternating syntonic perceptions vis-à-vis 
cosmic entities, whose pertinence to the human realm is real and essential 
for the constitution of human bodies.  Indeed, not only shamans, but 
also all active participants in festival performance take different corporeal 
perspectives, i.e., they transform their bodies by acting upon them and 
acting them out, incorporating affective dispositions rather than different 
souls.
 Yet, to the Marubo, bodies versus souls as translations and transpositions 
of distinctions between nature and culture remain relevant to the extent 
that they reveal themselves to be paradoxical, that is, temporary and, 
qua performance, temporal.  Instead of incorporating souls, shamans 
excorporate them through sound.  The Marubo explain that, through 
musical callings, the yovevo (plural form of yové) receive invitations during 
séances to visit the shaman’s body, the abode of shamanic souls, making 
it their own temporary dwelling (cf. Rosengren’s Matsigenka intra).  Yet, 
would that mean that during this spiritual exchange bodies might remain 
vacant?  No, as neither shamans’ souls nor yové spirits do quite “dwell” in 
bodies.  Their movement in relation to the yora body is centrifugal rather 
than centripetal, since it is manifest in song.  The conflation of souls into 
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bodies is latent as a left versus right, pragmatic tautology.  In the actuality 
of music, bodies and souls conflate as humans and animals, and as spirits 
and doubles.  The music shamans intone is spiritual.  It is the actualization 
of a latent identity between right-hand soul, mekirí vaká, and the yové 
spirit.  Such spiritual expression encompasses, in reiterative musical cells, 
the succession of verbal verses that narrate the original generation and 
degeneration that yochĩ (animal doubles) represent.
 The extraordinary shamanic discourse, the “spiritual language” (yové 
vana) or music, is the consequence or cause of an exterior journey, or rather 
a projection of external voices that are at once carnal and animalic.  Marubo 
bodies, or at least their singing throats kene mõti (with beautiful geometrical, 
although invisible designs) that sing yové vana, are a means as much as a 
substratum.  Spiritual and animalic entities are not within yora bodies, but 
stand instead as potentialities behind and beyond the original conjunction 
of bodily souls.  Marubo souls are always made “real” through bodily vocal 
chords, which vibrate with musical sympathy when under the stimulus of 
an exogenous, spiritual and animal, supernatural and natural yové voice. 
Thus, these qualifying categories of “spiritual” and “animal” are awkwardly 
antinomic, inasmuch as yora bodies, if split into animalic hemispheres, do 
not sound in opposition to their soul/anatomical constituents (mekirí and 
mechmirí vaká).  The relevant native opposition lies between these souls 
themselves and in their relation with superhuman, extracorporeal cosmic 
entities (the yochĩ doubles and yové spirits)—or between humans and 
animals—even though such a relation rests upon a seemingly Aristotelian 
opposition.  Latency and actuality should be read as temporality.  From 
such a reading, it can be determined that the Marubo resist through the 
use of time.  To the chagrin of proselytizing missionaries, their souls are as 
impervious to an opposition with their bodies, as shamans and shamanic 
practices are omnipresent and resistant among these -nawa peoples.
 This is why indigenous Marubo knowledge pertains to, and indeed is, 
both saiti and other song forms, and why such knowledge is reducible to such 
musical ontology.  It is, however, irreducible to distinctions in terms of bodily 
substances against animating forms that would allow for a self-sufficient 
encyclopedic compilation of “key concepts” in ethnography.  Rather than 
being abstract designations of a more or less concrete semantic content, 
the saiti contain immanent meanings—as in the transcriptions above—
that transcend the designative meaning of words.  These transcriptions, 
which might be called “sonic structures,” are heuristic constructs meant 
to highlight the power of verbalization and “musicalization” of sound. 
To sing, among the Marubo, means both to incorporate difference and 
to “excorporate” sameness with and within the world—that is, with 
9
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animals, plants, or things, all ethnonymic constituents—within a temporal 
framework.   
ETHNONYMIC DUALISM
 The dual animality, the soul duality of indigenous anatomy, and the 
consequent connection of humans with birds and animals—that in the 
everyday are either prey or predator to the Marubo—become actual in the 
performance of the linear stories of saiti, in particular in those that the 
Marubo call “emergence” (wenia).  A saiti such as Mokanawa Wenia, the 
emergence of the “wild-bitter peoples” (i.e., peoples of the forest), projects 
the body-soul of the future, merging humanity into two animal forms, the 
yové spirit and the yochĩ double, as its story is told throughout its successive 
verbal verses within recurrent musical cells.  In such saiti genesis, the creation 
of humans is coterminous with this pair of soul entities, which are heard 
less in words than in melodies.  In the words of the myth-chants of wenia, 
humanity comes out of an indirect, successive identification with predatory 
animals and birds.  Peoples emerge out of original substances on earth 
that are associated with animals of prey or predation, while each emerging 
mokanawa people thus acquires their names, and then their language, in 
association with a bird.  The fact that yové and yochĩ—these animalic and 
anatomic self-constituents of humanity—identify in myth-chant to each 
prototypical animal is consistent with the connections that onomastics 
establish (in those same saiti as well as in the everyday) between the world 
of the Marubo and the words the Marubo intone.  Ethnonymic animals 
are a primary prototype of human beings qua social selves: humanity with 
-nawa names.
 Although well-known in the literature on Panoans, these -nawa 
names also call for explanation.  In saiti myth-chants and in the everyday, 
Marubo persons and alternate-generation matrilateral kinship sections 
come into existence and receive names after animals, plants, and things 
at large, e.g., Shanenawa, Inonawa, Varinawa, et cetra.  These peoples 
are “Blue-Green Birds” (Shane), “Jaguars” (Ino) and, among other plants 
and things, they are also “Suns” (Vari).  These are -nawa peoples.  They 
conceive of and maintain humanity as bifurcated kinship groups.  The self 
is the prototype of the other, and vice versa.  Animal others are human 
selves through an ethnonymic equation.  Human beings gain names after 
animals, while animals become paradigms of both alterity and identity 
due to the ambiguous status of nawa (which is a suffix as well as a single 
word).  Rather than a monovalent category, “animal” is dual, because its 
10
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humanization in musical poetics (into -nawa ethnonyms) endows it with 
a dual latency (yochĩ and yové).11  
 Said another way, after the original wenia-creation of humans in 
some saiti myth-chants, such as Mokanawa Wenia, the animals of prey 
and predation and the birds that help the constitution of humanity, as well 
as plants and others things, together equate to the everyday human self 
through personal names and ethnonyms.  That these predatory animals and 
birds are divisible into two categories (pertaining to yové birds and relating 
to yochĩ predators and preys) that exhaust neither the everyday variability 
of ethnonyms (including plants and other things) nor the subject-matter 
of human self-constitution (namely nawa-ness) suggest that predation 
and vocality are no more than (essential) attributes of humanity.  Both 
predation and vocality are attributions that humans get from animals and 
birds in their -nawa constitutions.  Predation and vocality are attributes 
because humans acquire animality as soul-potentialities.  Humans are 
humans only due to a proper balance between two animal potentialities 
within their bodies.  Thus, those animal categories, yochĩ and yové, are 
neither substantial nor adjectival to humanity, despite being essential (with 
their essentiality contained in their nawa-character).  These categories 
are not mutually exclusion from the tight categories of nature or super-
nature.  Due to the peculiar place occupied by animality in such ontology, 
the ethnonymic and anthropogenic statuses of animals place Marubo in a 
position of resistance against conceptual universals.
 These statements are indications of that which only the saiti myth-
chants of creation (through the enfolding of temporal structures) can 
unfold.  That is, rather than material substance (“mere raw matter,” as 
are the chetsots bodies of Santos-Granero’s Yanesha), yora bodies, qua 
substrata, are the subjective actualization of souls made into potential 
objects, the actual subjectification of objective potentialities.  The animal 
hypostasis within humans is the logical, transformational counterpart of 
the soul that materializes in the outside as exogenous, immoral yochĩ illness 
or exospheric, moral yové paradigm.  Or additionally, the animal hypostasis 
is the soul counterpart of the animal ethnonym.  Thus, Marubo souls are 
potential “double diseases” or spirit-helpers, and original -nawa names are 
potential objectifications of supra-yora subjectivities.  The external animal 
is potentially the bodily equivalent to internal human souls.  Yora bodies 
are potential yochĩ doubles and yové spirits, whereas their bodies constituent 
vaká-souls and are not an exclusive essence of humanity.  On the contrary, 
souls of left and right—made manifest qua percepts in the eye (vero yochĩ) 
and excreta (isõ yochĩ, poĩ yochĩ), in breath-thoughts (chinã) and shadows 
(noke yochĩ )—are also emblems of nonhumanity, if such a distinction from 
11
On Body and Soul
Published by Digital Commons @ Trinity, 2006
114         Guilherme Werlang
the human realm is pertinent at all.
 In fact, while the axionomy of yochĩ and yové entities maintain variable 
correspondence with other ontological dichotomies in Amazonia,12 the 
point in question is that analyses and analogies departing from such 
categorial templates as bodies versus souls, qua analytical analogues to 
nature versus culture, are not at all pertinent in stasis: such “doubles” and 
“spirits” exist only as potential aspects within and in relation to yora bodies, 
i.e., humans.  The peculiarity of such an opposition of values is that yochĩ 
doubles and yové spirits are beyond the human body, and at the same time 
constitute it as potentialities.13  
 Although this is a given in saiti, it is not lost in the mythical past. 
As for John Renshaw’s Ayoreo (intra), such a chronological notion of the 
mythical as remote would itself be a myth.  Those foregoing distinctions—
yové spirit and yochĩ double; bird and predatory animal; subjects and 
objects; and humans and things in the world—are themselves the recurrent 
grounding of indigenous humanity.  These -nawa peoples are the object 
of cultural denominations, i.e., they are yora (proper humans) inasmuch as 
their subjectivity temporally equates to that of objective nature (animals, 
plants, and other things).  The Marubo are peoples of the Blue-Green 
Bird (Shanenawa), of the Jaguar (Inonawa), and of the Sun (Varinawa). 
Human creation is cosmogenesis, that is, of plants, animals, and things in 
the world at large.  The hypostasis of humanity, if anything, is a somatic 
state of symphonic synthesis.14  
 Ethnonymic animals, plants, and other things aside, the equation that 
conjoins animals and humans, selves, and others makes still more sense with 
reference to another category of animal that is neither bird nor predator. 
This is the white-lipped peccary (yawa) that comes to the fore ritually in 
mimicry, during festivals celebrating and propitiating the hunt.  In those 
cynegetic, specific saiti festivals, the mock-figure of the peccary, which 
mock-hunters gather into a pack, is the prototypical prey.  The reference to 
this animal alludes to myth again, in the saiti chant of Yawa Tivo.  Among 
kinship sections, yawa is not an emblematic animal for humans.  It is, 
however, a most emblematic animal for hunting, a preferential prey.15  
 Peccary hunting is a social event par excellence, for it gathers 
together large numbers of people from several neighboring longhouses, 
including men, women, and children.  These hunting expeditions serve to 
create, consolidate, and display ties of solidarity in family life, especially 
among young couples, who are perceived to be on their way to a happy 
marriage when seen hunting together.  To chase and kill the numerous 
and dangerous herds requires team strategy.  The result provides enough 
food for a banquet, and promotes opportunities for festivals.  As in some 
12
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saiti festivals, there is choreography and musical chanting associated with 
a symbolic pantomime, in which men, women, and children alternatively 
represent the actors in a ritual hunt.  Yawa peccaries, their favorite prey, call 
for a different identification with humans than that which ontologically 
exists between humanity and namesake animality by means of ethnonyms, 
of soul-dualities—of the saiti myth-chants of wenia creation.  Again, 
it is in listening to Yawa Tivo, the myth-music that sings both creation 
and transformation, that such a differential identity tends to make more 
sense.
 If birds and predators relate to  the human -nawa as indexes of 
nomination in myth and daily dealings, humans relate to peccaries in 
hunting and the saiti of Yawa Tivo.  Between the human hunter and 
the prototypical peccary prey (that which the propitiatory saiti festival 
anticipates), their relationship becomes a reality during the actual hunt. 
It is one of common ancestry, as that saiti shows.  This time, instead of 
describing humans emerging from animal substance—as with wenia-
emergence—myth-music shows peccaries as transformations of humans. 
If the myth-chants of wenia-creation establish constitutive connections 
between birds and animals of predation on the one hand, and humans on 
the other, in this myth the ancestral humanity of peccaries connects prey to 
the human predator.  Peccary preys are perverted, corrupted human selves, 
but the morality of such perversion seems less than relevant.  The moral 
connection between humans and animals is seen more clearly in their 
original ties of kinship.  Yawa Tivo saiti draws alternative kin connections 
to those that other myth-chants posit between humans and their sectional 
namesakes.  If, in wenia-creation, humanity is nawa-prototypical, 
substantial transformation from ethnonymic animals such as the white-
lipped peccary, the yawa of saiti is instead tivo, a means of indicating its 
special status with respect to human predation.
 As with nawa, the word tivo also denotes by itself “prototypical” and 
“large.”  But, it does not have the same “foreign” denotation, having instead 
a subtle connotation inflecting toward the interior, either consanguineous 
or affinal.  The peccary-tivo, prototypical prey, does not share essence with 
humans in the same “family resemblance” fashion as their animal namesakes 
do (see Werlang 2001).  If ethnonymic animals somehow generate humans, 
through common bonds of metonymical or metaphorical substance, then 
some humans, once in myth, generate peccaries.
 Tivo could be the product of an etymological amalgamation of the 
nominal and plural suffixes -ti + -vo (“widely” or “largely”).  This would be 
consistent with its meaning in several saiti.  But in mythical-musical usage, 
tivo applies to animals only.  The qualifying word has a central meaning—
13
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at least in two of the five myth-chants above—in Yawa Tivo and in Teté 
Teka.  In the latter, the main protagonist, the original predatory animal, 
the giant teté hawk has the nickname of txai tivo, the inimical affine of 
humanity, who is, at least, an affinal figure to those humans who, in their 
original, myth-music dimension, persist in their quest for a dwelling on 
earth.  In this instance, txai tivo denotes many inflections that share some 
connotative common ground.  The phrase literally means “big cross-cousin,” 
or “prototypical affine or brother-in-law.”  It is a kin creature, but also an 
“enemy.”  Its immediate denotation is that of the large bird of prey teté, the 
saiti protagonist.  Furthermore, it can connote “living site,” or “prototypical 
dwelling.”   In short, the teté hawk qua txai tivo is the “longhouse-cross-
cousin.”  When it dies—euphemistically shot (teka) by the original 
humanity—it inaugurates affinity out of a former claim of consanguinity, 
just as the transformation of peccaries, in Yawa Tivo, inaugurates human 
predation of animals.  In other words, tivo means “largely other,” with 
reference both to teté hawk and yawa peccary.  It resounds “constituent 
alterity.”  But tivo signifies affinity out of consanguinity, just the status that 
predation must have, while nawa is the reverse, following the principle of 
sameness out of difference.  For, tivo is animal, while nawa is human.
ONTOLOGICAL DUALISM
 The distinction between nawa and tivo is just another layer of 
meaning revolving around the notions of humanity and animality among 
the Marubo.  In the spirit of avoiding facile categorizations and thereby 
avoiding essentialism, I will condense three issues that have direct bearing 
on the possibility of indigenous elaboration on our notions of body and 
soul.
 The first issue is that the original, mythical state of a common 
humanity /animality—presumably a universal in Amazonia—is a state of 
transient mutability, one of temporal instability among the Marubo.  If one 
is to follow the form of their expression and manifestation in saiti poetics, 
in music, and in movement, then human/animal commonalities exist in a 
transmutability that lies in between those ontological provinces that relate 
respectively to birds and to predators and prey, as well as to plants and 
to things “other.”  The human condition is itself a liminal state, as seen 
in occasional references to initiation in saiti and as otherwise depicted 
in myth-chants.  The human lot is a ritual re-enactment throughout life 
in hunting, illness, curing, and eventually at death and in post-mortem 
limbo, when souls linger either on earth or ascend to the sky in renewal. 
14
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Although some saiti are full of propitiatory references (possible remnants 
of increase rites), most festivals are generic and periodic.  Saiti is a general 
human, social condition of growth, decay, and renewal.  There is no scope 
for eternal ideas here, for indigenous dualism is not bidimensional.
 The mutual and commutable transformability—between humans and 
birds, on the one hand, and “animal others” on the other—constitutes 
humanity both in the present everyday and through mythical-musical 
time.  This differential chronology presents itself through sound, melding 
successive memories with a reiterative project for the future.  The way 
saiti myth-chants phrase, the issue allows for an ontological hierarchy 
or chronological order.  It is one between those temporal inflections of 
the human-becoming movement that such commonality of humanity 
with animal substance entails.  If musically circular, it is linear within its 
overarching, verbal dimension.  
 In the saiti of wenia-emergence, humans first emerge as a synthesis of 
predatory animals, and then acquire language from birds.  The thorough 
circular repetition of this movement during its performance, in turn, 
makes humans out of yochĩ and yové, making them yochĩ and yové (the 
possibilities of disease and health, potential destinies along life, and actual 
destinations at death).  In performance, over time—including genesis, life, 
and death—living human souls, as constituents of yora bodies, are animal 
and then spiritual, pure potentialities to becoming successively in the after-
life the yochĩ-full path of eschatological transformations.  Vei vai precedes 
the dwelling of yové-renovation shoko nai shavaya, the cosmic dwelling that 
hangs above this “land of ours,” this “dangerous land of transformations” 
(nokĩ mai, vei mai shavaya).  Both in this world and the otherworld, yové 
spirits are the circular periodicity of flight, yochĩ doubles in their discrete 
linearity.  
 On earth, the eschatological journey occurs in the saiti of Vei Vai 
Yoya, the myth-chant that leads through the dangerous postmortem path, 
performing in mythical musical form, in a special choreography, such 
transmutations of living and deadly forms.  Here the yoya song-leader 
leads both the saiti myth-chant and the accompanying singers, as he 
conducts the singing dancers in a meandering line instead of the usual 
circle.  The saiti of vei vai is the yoya, the guide himself is the myth-chant 
itself—and, as for many saiti myth-chants, here is indigenous ontology in 
brief: if vai means “path,” vei means both the dangers of death and afterlife 
transformations.
 A second argument particularizes Marubo idiosyncrasies against 
Amazonian essentialisms  (it is one that follows the first about the original 
mythical state of human / animal transient mutability being of temporal 
15
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instability among the Marubo).  The discussion above derives from a 
native commentary during one myth-music translation.  In Yawa Tivo, the 
destinies of the transformative peccaries differ according to the sensory-
predatory attitude of the original humans in relation to abnormal prey: 
the eggs of a yové-spiritual bird.  The destiny of the original humans who 
undergo transformation depends on how they eat the eggs of yawa chai, 
the peccary bird, or whether they simply smell the eggshells (an emblem 
of filial bonds16).  Some of the peccary-made, ex-nawa humans remain 
in earthly forests, the ancestors of those that humans prey upon today. 
Some peccaries stay on the banks of foreign rivers, in the domains of the 
nawa-foreign, and thus become domestic pigs.  Westerners do not bear 
sectional ethnonyms, just as indigenous sectional names do not include the 
would-be yawanawa (“children-peoples of the peccary”).  White people 
are semantically closer to peccaries than to the Sun and the Blue Bird, the 
Jaguar and other such beings, and other entities from the Marubo world. 
Finally, some of the human-generated peccaries ascend to the yové-skies 
of regeneration.
 In Shane Memi Yõsha, a human almost transmutes into game animal, a 
yochĩ double par excellence.  Before, however, as in much mythical music, 
human transmutation into another being follows the same heavenly 
destiny of the dead yové-like souls.  In Yawa Tivo, some of the humans who 
transform into animals ascend to the spiritual abode of bodily renovation 
(shoko nai shavaya).  They do so with their bodies and all, not with some 
sort of “spiritual peccary essence,” inasmuch as yové spirits are bodies.  As 
contradictory as this might sound to Cartesians, spiritual identification is 
substantial.  Ontological provinces melt when a shamanic soul partakes of 
yové-spiritual food, and thus gets lost.  Likewise, the transformative peccaries 
are bound to feast on the savory plants of paradise, like the old woman and 
the tapir in the saiti above.  As elsewhere in Amazonia, commensality is 
consubstantiality.  All these animal-made humans, human-made human 
prey, at some point and in some way do transform themselves substantially 
into yové spirits, just as corporeal change in shamanic initiation means 
yové-becoming.  In Yawa Tivo, those who die for tasting or smelling the 
peccary-bird egg-zygote end up congregating with spiritual creatures—
sensual, fragrant, ornamental bodies.
 Still in the same saiti, some other peccary-made humans remain in 
this original nawa domain, the noa mato large riverbanks of this earthly 
human dwelling (mai shavaya), and thus become domestic.  This means 
an attribute more of exteriority than domestication: peccaries are always 
wild, foreign pigs are always domestic.  In this case, the original Marubo, 
the -nawa peoples became true nawa foreigners, true others insofar 
16
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as being domestic.  Just like ethnonymic animals—birds and predatory 
ones—peccaries fall into an ambivalent domain, one of alterity and 
equally of identity.  Nevertheless, the relational realm of the yawa peccary, 
of the prototypical prey is posterior to that of yové spirits and animal-
doubles, souls-cum-bodies, the sectional-ethnonymic bird and predator or 
prey.  Peccaries are a generic nawa-category, rather than one particular, 
indigenous categorization of the -nawa peoples.  They are tivo.
 This is the third argument that particularizes Marubo idiosyncrasies 
against Amazonian essentialisms—one which implies another reference to 
history, mythical or otherwise.  Along historical and mythical time, these 
peoples perform a gradual construction of the notion of nawa, through a 
migratory movement from large river valleys to tributary headwaters—a 
geographic movement that parallels their attitude to the outside, toward 
their settlement limits and the limits of their terrestrial world, their ethnic 
and cosmic boundaries.  This historical construction of the nawa-foreigner 
is parallel to the mythical origin of human tivo-predation.  Peccaries once 
were -nawa peoples, Varĩ, Shanĩ, Inõ, Kanã, and Chaĩ—peoples of the Sun, 
of the Blue-Green Bird, the Jaguar, Yellow Macaw, Generic Bird—but 
then became either yové-peccaries (“spiritual” ones); or else peccaries of 
prey, of the everyday type, those that identify with the yochĩ animal-double; 
or still domestic peccaries, Western-generic nawa.  The three categories of 
ex-nawa peccaries—spiritual peccaries, mere peccaries of prey or nawa-
foreign peccaries—come into being in a mutual assignment of diacritical 
values of humanity, cosmically and ethnically.  In the myth-chant, predatory 
alterity follows preliminary identity, similar to the actions taken in hunting 
rites, in opposition to the variability of the anthropogenic animal, plant, 
or thing that create the indigenous self.  Just as, in Yawa Tivo, the original 
-nawa humans migrate to the foreign domain of nawa-ness, and thus 
inaugurate predation.  In history humans were -nawa Indians, warlike 
others, and became Marubo—or “tamed” as they say, “domesticated”—as 
they encountered the White nawa (see Werlang 2001).  These notions 
of humanity and animality are a function of history, in myth and in the 
everyday.17  
AGAINST IDEOLOGY
 The issues of transformability of human souls into animal-like 
affective states, the substantial ambiguity of such bodily animic states vis-
à-vis predation, and the parallel between predation and the ambiguous 
substance of nawa-ness have something in common.  Beyond all these 
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three considerations, the underlying, undisguisable leading motive in 
question is the hypothesis of an Amazonian generality: virtual cultural 
attributes encompassing the natural domain at a supernatural level, where 
variable bodies fragment a unified constitution of souls into species-
specific perspectives.  This would ring explanatory in the Marubo case, 
if these peoples were not so resistant to a universal soul/body dichotomy 
as an atemporal and aspatial given, or as an invariant structure.  The 
hypotheses of neo-animism, perspectivism, and its developments require 
so many practical adjustments in this and other cases, that one wonders if 
it is worth subscribing to the debate.  Attention to indigenous ontology of 
necessity requires the nonengagement in any sort of modernistic “ism,” as 
my teacher Joanna Overing has taught me.
 It might be safer to dwell on idiosyncrasies: in this indigenous world 
“nature” is an incomplete gloss for a myriad of events and relations that only 
make sense within a wider framework, which, however, is so immanent 
that one can hardly distinguish what is “above” “supernature.”  What we do 
distinguish is temporality: historical chronology and mythical musicality—
and vice versa.  What we do have in terms of spatial organization among 
these peoples is set in temporal form and such form finds its voice in music. 
Such music in turn translates human genesis, while all ontogenesis stems 
from anthropogony. Finally, such human creation is an amalgamation of 
modalities of exteriority.  
 The yochĩ and yové entities, that populate the cosmos where human 
being and human becoming unfold, are themselves the operators of such 
native theories.  These doubles and spirits organize the living world 
and that of the afterlife in accordance with saiti, those self-explanatory 
spatiotemporal forms.  It is under such an intelligible framework, the 
founding distinction between yochĩ and yové, between the paradigmatic 
constituents of the human person and cosmos, that the dual perception of 
what we call “nature” obtains, in something that we might better call music. 
We could also pigeonhole it in a more-than-natural metaphysical domain. 
But still this would require that any tinge of post-Socratic metaphysics, 
be it in Platonic, Aristotelian or Judeo-Christian, be kept away from such 
musical expression.  After all, “What is Amazonian physis?”  The Muses 
may say “It is in music.”
 In the foregoing analysis, it is in the human body that spiritual and 
animal-double dispositions synthesize into a universal “soul-structure.”  If 
this somatic synthesis is analyzable in saiti, the disjunction and subsequent 
actualization of its terms come into effect in hunting, disease, and death. 
This seems to fit well with other regional contexts, where the human 
cultural primacy, or the cultural reality of humans—if you like—has to 
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undergo negotiation concurrently, a task that is either shamanic and/or 
predatory, taken up by different agents: shamans and hunters, spirits and 
animals.  Predation objectifies actual prey in the predatory act, and actualises 
human subjects, while shamans subjectify predators and prey.  But among 
the Marubo, nawa-humans, yové birds, and yochĩ doubles of predatory 
animality are the interlocutors of a musical dialogue.  The common-
ground of such concurrent parties, that which establishes humanity, is the 
point of convergence of the singing voice, between yochĩ and yové musical 
modes, cellular lines and circular verses.  It is in the saiti myth-chants that 
the protagonists of the worldly and otherworldly, the predatory and the 
eschatological arena are made audible, then visible and known to us.  The 
intersubjective mythical-musical discourse within longhouses establishes 
humanity.  The human voice is both self-constitution and cosmic sharing, 
as the saiti-object represents it.
AGAIN MYTH-MUSIC
 I conclude this essay by returneing to its opening theme: the 
reproduction of the formal musical dialectics of saiti myth-chants as verbal 
poetics.  As noted earlier with reference to the myth-chant of Shane Memi 
Yõsha, a current idiomatic phrase in saiti is a iki a nã, or a ikiao i (“thus said 
…”).  As in a play on stage, speeches are the attribution of a “third person” 
with respect to the audience—the actual third person—an attribute of 
either a character or the narrator, in the course of the story.  That mythical-
musical phrase is but a ritual version of a typical phrasal formula in the 
everyday language of the Marubo, yorã vana.  When one says iki‚ “they [he, 
she] said” following any statement, the agency of the utterance belongs to 
a third party, regardless of who delivers it.  If the Araweté shaman is “like 
a radio” (Viveiros de Castro 1992:224), if the Juruna one is “nothing but 
a spokesman” (Stolze Lima 1999:119), the Marubo singer is said to be a 
recorder, whose song is a playback of an exogenous narrative.  Instead of 
a universal statement of truth, the shaman provides statements of many 
voices, a diachronic verbal polyphony.  The multiperceptive shaman is a 
mutant, a glyph—a hyperbolical yora body, as all such bodies divide into 
contradictory animic modalities.  Shamans see multiple perspectives and 
experience multiple bodies to the sole extent that they can perform the 
multivocality implicit in humans, and this is an endowment from the yové-
bird spirits.  From the viewpoint of the cross-eyed shaman, the line is 
always out of focus—or rather ex-centric, twisted into a spiral—because 
the temporal lines that represent his ontology are aural before being 
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visual.  Aurality is already a familiar epistemological trait in Amazonia 
(see Santos-Granero, intra).  It might be worth hypothesising that its 
ontological grounds are musical (cf., Seeger 1987; Bastos 1999).  
 Marubo musical lines inflect time, and hence the terrestrial space of 
yochĩ doubles, into circular, celestial curves, the recurrent rhythmic, melodic 
cells and verses of saiti.  Not accidentally, saiti chants present no such clear 
spatial, wider linear structure as the linguistic transcription of a mythical 
narrative might portray.  The Marubo saiti, and perhaps much of Amazonian 
myth, so dearly apt for reduction to linguistic-structural discourses, is less 
reducible to “mythemes” than to “musical cells,” examples of which figure 
above.  If any unitary discursive perspective is only perceivable at the verbal 
level of myth, musical unity in the saiti myth-chants is always reducible to 
no more than the equal, reiterative cell—or at best to verbally strophic or 
formulaic groups of cells, which emulate the single cell.  The reiterative 
fragment, the sole circular limit is a unique musical-poetical boundary. 
That which is ineffable in ordinary language is bound in saiti words by the 
sound of mythical time—musical-poetical expression.
 Mythical and musical utterances, those which fall under the same 
categorising umbrella of saiti, are messages whose first production 
and apprehension—the aural analogue of the visual allegories of Plato 
(Cornford 1983)—come from sound.  They also always do so from the 
perspective of an out-centred ontology that encompasses any human made-
up construction as external, cosmic agency, since saiti rejects solipsistic 
subjects.   Marubo ontology is, instead, within the yora body—but not 
there only.  The “animation” of such body is spiritual and animal at once, 
in dual ways that differ fundamentally from ours, inasmuch as, among 
these peoples—as among the Piaroa and other Amerindians (Overing 
1996, 1997; Storrie, intra)—there is no such thing as a dead carnal matter 
whose life is soul-forms.   For the Marubo, nami is the “meat” one may 
eat, occasionally our “flesh,” which hardly fits into a notion of “body” as 
against “souls.”  The course of disease and the action of disease agents, 
for instance, is upon nami flesh, while that of the healer is upon the yora 
body.  But, the actualization of cure occurs through the description, 
invocation, and articulation of yochĩ-like and yové-like entities in curing 
chants.  Without regaining such proper balance, the yora body is bound to 
follow its postmortem fate, which one would best describe, invocate and 
articulate as animic dissolution, rather than empty carnality.  Nothing is 
left to stand for a “body-in-itself ” once each soul-like body component 
actualizes its divergent, disintegrative destiny—mekirí vaká and chinã to 
the supernal realm of rejuvenation as yové spirits, mekirí vaká and other 
yochĩ-forms to doubling, terrestrial wandering.  Because death divests the 
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yora body of its suprapersonal subjectivity, a dead corpse amounts to an 
object of the dead, to his or her surroundings.  Two or three generations 
ago, mourning relatives would burn and eat the corpse, and might even set 
fire to the whole longhouse with the belongings of the dead inside.  For a 
dead body is “no-thing”: it is linear space that, by itself, cannot achieve the 
circular temporality of musical spirits.
 The structure that informs such soul-body relations between entities 
such as yora and nawa, yochĩ and yové, mechmirí and mekirí-vaká is deep 
within and still far without humanity and the human body.  Marubo 
culture is not opposed or post-positioned to nature, being instead an 
original state both behind and beyond it, supernatural and infra-natural. 
Marubo humanity is described and prescribed, originated and predicted 
within these two realms, which in the saiti myth-chants intertwine in 
one.  Humanity is a “now” that is neither instantaneous, nor the “zero” of a 
linear timescale.  Rather, it is a “corporeal” but still “spiritual” condition, a 
“musical” condition these peoples might say, if they had the need to put it 
in words.  Rather, they intone their words.  
 True, this is a local worldview.   But, whose worldview, is it if the 
“native viewpoint” is taken?  As regard the Marubo, we cannot rely on 
visual perspectives, inasmuch as we cannot oppose the universal to the 
particular.  For these peoples, culture is not an exclusive human attribute 
that humanity should be proud of—in the Faustian sense—either in 
absolute or relative terms.  While we should be vigilant against Western-
metaphysical vocabulary and the oppositions it entails, (e.g., the a priori 
dichotomizing of senses versus intellect, or nature versus “supernature”), 
one cannot do without an ethnographic dialogue with such dualities and 
with those who invoke them, even if—or only if—that stance might take us 
to paradoxical statements.  If, among the Marubo, the human condition is 
a cultural attribute, it is one which obtains through temporal incorporation 
and “excorporation” of animal and spiritual affections, which widens the 
doors of perception to the world and voices that world.  Their world is in 
continuous synesthetic translation as a musical performance.  
NOTES
 1.  For ethnographic background see Melatti 1977,1981; Montagner Melatti 
1985; and Werlang 2000, 2001.
 2.  According to Martin Heidegger: “… subsiste, todavia, a necessidade de, 
nas diferentes etapas do caminho, falar justamente na linguagem que convém” 
(1990 [1977]:73).
21
On Body and Soul
Published by Digital Commons @ Trinity, 2006
124         Guilherme Werlang
 3.  Pedro Cesarino is carrying out doctoral research on myth and poetics 
among the very same people discussed in this paper.
 4.  An exception to this is made for the soul’s highest functions that need no 
affection, just as with the “immovable mover” on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, an early 
version of the Judeo-Christian God.  See Aristotle 1986.
 5.  See Viveiros de Castro (1999), as well as his contribution in Bird David 
(1999).
 6.  Metonimycally, “shane” means also a “blue-green” bird species (Cesarino 
says azulão, giving a “bluish” inflection to indigenous perception).
 7.  Cesarino dissects: a iki aoi = demonstrative + auxiliary intransitive “to say” 
+ again?  The locution could have an immediate, inconclusive inflection.
 8.  The New Tribes Mission has been present in the area since the early 
1950s.
 9.  According to Freud: “It might be said that in the last analysis the ‘spirit’ of 
persons or things comes down to their capacity to be remembered and imagined 
after perception of them has ceased” (1950 [1913]:117).  
 10.  See Århem (1993), Descola (1994), and Stolze Lima (1999) for 
representative explications for shamanic hunting in Amazonia; and Erikson (1996) 
for Panoans; and Viveiros de Castro (1998) for an ethnographic synthesis.
 11.  The Vari of the Varinawavo would be a residual category, but nonetheless 
a very conspicuous one in saiti.  It is probably is filled with exogenous meanings 
as well, since the association between the “Sun” and the “Inca” is a conspicuous 
mythological theme among Panoans, as among the Cashinahua (cf. Lagrou 
1998).
 12.  As with the Piaroa’s “life of thoughts” versus “life of the senses” (Overing 
1988), and the Yanesha’s yechoyeshem “shadow” versus yecamquëñ “vitality” (Santos-
Granero intra).
 13.  Overing observes that, among the Piaroa: “… the uniqueness of terrestrial 
human beings is due to the particular combination of forces for life that they are 
today able to acquire” (1999:10).
 14.  Again, according to Overing: “Because the animals exist eternally in the 
‘before time’…  they affect earthly human in a literal fashion” (1999:12).
 15.  Although Yawanawa is an actual ethnonym (of peoples who live in the 
neighboring Brazilian State of Acre, who are akin to the Marubo) it is composed 
of is an unknown combinatory designation among their matrilateral sections.  For 
historical connections between both peoples, see Coffaci de Lima 1994.
 16.  In ordinary language, vatxi means both “egg” and the typical tubular skirt 
women fold around their waist.  The Marubo use vatxi in a curious expression to 
designate precisely one’s natal provenience: “there where I left my eggshell.”  This 
expression suggests the idea that vatxi is like a genetic wrapper, and makes the 
association between “egg,” “skirt,” and, say, “female reproductive capabilities,” or 
simply “womb” or “afterbirth,” which leads to the human origins of peccaries.
 17.  Compare this with the sense of domestication for the Piaroa, that is also 
“externalist” according to Overing (1988, 1996).
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